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FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 519

~~S E C R E T~~ KHARTOUM 2367

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FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, SU, US, EG
SUBJECT: USG/GOS RELATIONS IN LIGHT SADAT VISIT

1. NIMEIRI'S FORTHRIGHT SUPPORT OF SADAT, HIS ALMOST UNIQUE PUBLIC APPROVAL AMONG ARAB LEADERS OF SINAI II (KHARTOUM 2105) AND THE CLOSE WORKING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO NILE NATIONS COMBINE TO SUGGEST THAT SADAT'S PENDING STATE VISIT TO WASHINGTO COULD OCCASION SOME SORT OF EGYPTIAN PLEA TO US FOR FASTER PACE IN NORMALIZATION OF USG/GOS RELATIONS. IF OUR RESPONSE COULD BE POSITIVE, THIS WOULD SEEM LIKELY FURTHER BUTTRESS EGYPTIAN POSITION HERE. YOU MAY THEREFORE WISH CONSIDER WHETHER MOMENT HAS ARRIVED FOR FAVORABLE ACTION ON SECOND STEP IN OUR NORMALIZATION PROCESS. IF SO, I RECOMMEND THAT "HOLDS" BE REMOVED FROM: (A) CONSIDERATION OF PL 480 SALES; AND (B) RE-OPENING OF OUR DATT OFFICE HERE. FORMER WOULD MAKE POSSIBLE REVIEW WITH GOS SPECIFICS OF ITS JUNE REQUEST FOR WHEAT, NEED FOR WHICH HAS PROBABLY INCREASED DUE RECENT MAJOR NILE FLOODS. LATTER WOULD PROVIDE WELCOME SYMBOL HERE TO AMERICAN-TRAINED OFFICERS, FROM NIMEIRI ON DOWN, AT TIME THEY ARE SEEKING TO BROADEN REGIME'S ONCE LARGELY SOVIET CONTACTS IN MILITARY FIELD (KHARTOUM 2283). BOTH STEPS WOULD BE IN USG INTEREST BY SERVING ENCOURAGE NIMEIRI REGIME IN ITS PRESENT RESPONSIBLE COURSE.

2. SHOULD FOREGOING COMMEND ITSELF TO YOU, IT MAY WELL BE

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THOUGHT USEFUL AND FEASIBLE AT SOME TIME TO OBTAIN FROM EGYPTIANS SOME SORT OF UP-DATING OF ASSURANCES OF JULY, 1974, THAT KHARTOUM MURDERES WILL REMAIN IN CUSTODY IN EGYPT.

3. AS BACKGROUND TO FOREGOING, IT IS WORTH NOTING THAT, SINCE EXIM AND OPIC "HOLDS" WERE REMOVED LAST MAY, SUDANESE RECORD ON INTERNATIONAL AND BILATERAL ISSUESHDAS INCLUDED: (A) SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN POSTPONEMENT ARAB SUMMIT, WHICH COULD HAVE COMPLICATED NIMEIRI'S PENDING ERITREAN MEDIATION; (B) EVIDENT SUPPORT FOR MODERATES AT OAU AND LIMA ON ISRAELI UN CREDENTIALS ISSUE; (C) PUBLIC NIMEIRI ENDORSEMENT OF SINAI 88 -- AN ENDORSEMENT HE PUBLICLY REITERATED AFTER SYRIAN EFFORTS PERSUADE HIM OTHERWISE; (D) FORTHRIGHT SUPPORT BY SUDANESE FONMIN OF YOUR MAJOR ADDRESS BEFORE 7TH SPECIAL UNGA; (E) PUBLIC CENSURE MADRID TERRORIST CAPER BY NIMEIRI'S POLITICAL ORGANIZATION; (F) PRIVATE NIMEIRI WILLINGNESS HELP SAFURE UNCONDITIONAL RELEASE FOUR AMERICANS STILL HELD BY ERITREANS; AND (G) INFORMAL SUDANESE AUTHORIZATION FOR FIST USN SHIP VISIT SINCE 1967. WERE UNDUE ASYMMETRY TO DEVELOP IN OUR RELEATIONSHIPS WITH THE SUDANESE, THIS WOULD SEEM FROM HERE UNLIKELY TO CONTRIBUTE TO NOURISHING OUR WIDER INTERESTS. IT COULD BE CONCLUDED THAT TIMING WOULD APPEAR RIPE FOR CONSIDERATION SECOND STEP IN NORMALIZATION PROCESS EVEN WERE SADAT NOT IN POSITION TO CLAIM PART OF THE CREDIT.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 871

~~S E C R E T~~ KHARTOUM 0010

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STATE PASS OTHER AFRICAN POSTS AS APPROPRIATE

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, AO
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE ON ANGOLA

REF: STATE 001377

BEGIN SUMMARY: NIMEIRI MOST GRATEFUL FOR PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE WHICH HE CLAIMED ENUNCIATED ANGOLAN POLICY SIMILAR TO THAT OF SUDAN. DIFFERENCE WITH USG CONCERNS MEANS, NOT ENDS. AT COMING OAU SUMMIT, GOS WILL SEEK PERSUADE OAU TO REVIVIFY ITS ANGOLAN COMMISSION WITH INSTRUCTIONS WORK FOR IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE AND ESTABLISHMENT REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT THROUGH SOME FORM OF GENERAL ELECTIONS. END SUMMARY.

1. NIMEIRI RECEIVED ME NOON JANUARY 4 FOR DELIVERY PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE (REFTEL). FONMIN AHMED WAS PRESENT. AFTER READING MESSAGE CAREFULLY, NIMEIRI SAID THAT HE PLEASED WITH PRESIDENT FORD'S POSITION, IN PARTICULAR ASSURANCE THAT USG IN NO WAY SOUGHT OR ENCOURAGED SOUTH AFRICAN INVOLVENENT ANGOLA. SUDAN HAD FOLLOWED AKIN TO THAT OF USG POLICY UNTIL REPORTS HAD MULTIPLIED OF SOUTH AFRICAN INTERVENTION. AS AFRICAN STATE, THIS WAS SOMETHING SUDAN COULD NOT ACCEPT. HE THEN SAID NO AFRICAN COUNTRY WANTED EITHER SOUTH AFRICAN OR SOVIETS MEDDLING THERE.

2. NIMEIRI CONTINUED THAT HIS RECENT ACTION IN RECOGNIZING

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MPLA REGIME HAD BEEN DESIGNED TO DISCOURAGE USSR FROM ADDITIONAL INTERVENTION. SUDAN HAD "PROOF" THAT UNSPECIFIED NEIGHBORS HAD "STRATEGIC DESIGNS" ON ANGOLAN INDEPENDENCE. IT WAS TO FRUSTRATE THEIR EFFORTS, AND BECAUSE GOS BELIEVED THAT MPLA REPRESENTED MOST NEARLY A TRUE ANGOLAN NATIONAL MOVEMENT THAT SUDAN HAD FROM BEGINNING ASSISTED MPLA. NOTING LATTER GROUP HAS SOME ANTI-COMMUNIST MEMBERS, NIMEIRI STRESSED THAT GOS RECOGNITION WAS DESIGNED STRENGTHEN MODERATE WING MPLA, WHEREAS NON-RECOGNITION WOULD HAVE PLAYED INTO HANDS EXTREMISTS.

3. NIEMRI CONTINUED THAT HE FULLY SUPPORTED PRINCIPAL ENUNCIATED IN PRESIDENT'S LETTER OF LEAVING SOLUTION ANGOLAN PROBLEM TO THE ANGOLANS THEMSELVES. IT WAS JUST MEANS USG AND GOS WERE ADOPTING THAT DIFFERED. SUDAN AND NIGERIA HAD AGREED THAT RECOGNITION OF THE MPLA IS THE COURSE OF ACTION BEST CALCULATED TO ENCOURAGE THAT GROUP TO BECOME MORE MODERATE, NIMEIRI WAS CRITICAL MPLA'S DEPENDENCE ON SOVIETS AND CUBANS, CLAIMING HIS RECOGNITION LUANDA REGIME WAS DESIGNED TO HELP PREVENT DISMEMBERMENT OF ANGOLA. HE NOTED THAT HE WOULD RECEIVE VICE CHAIRMAN SOVIET PRESIDIUM, S.B. NIYAZBOKOV, CURRENTLY VISITING SUDAN, FOLLOWING LATTER'S RETURN FROM SOUTH. HE PLANNED TELL NIYAZBOKOV THAT USSR SHOULD CEASE MAJOR INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA LEST THIS ESCALATE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SUPER POWERS AND HE WOULD ASK NIYAZBOKOB PASS THIS MESSAGE ON TO MOSCOW. NIMEIRI CONCLUDED THAT HE HOPED HAVE FORMAL REPLY TO PRESIDENT'S LETTER TOMORROW AND SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO CONTINUE "BROADER COOPERATION" WITH US.

4. THANKING NIMEIRI FOR HIS FRANKNESS, I COMMENTED THAT SUDAN'S ACTION OF SUPPORTING MPLA HARDLY SEEMED METHOD BEST CALCULATED TO BRING ABOUT END WE BOTH EVIDENTLY SOUGHT OF COMPROMISE SOLUTION AMONG ANGOLAN FACTIONS WITHOUT FOREIGN INTERFERENCE. AS THINGS STOOD, GOS HAD RECOGNIZED ONE PARTY WHICH DREW MOST OF ITS SUPPORT FROM OVER 5,000 CUBAN TROOPS AND ADDITIONAL SOVIET ADVISORS. SHOULD SUCH REGIME TRIUMPH, IT WOULD BE HARDLY LIKELY TO BE ABLE ACT AS FREE AGENT IN DIRECTION NIMEIRI HOPED. PRESIDENT REPLIED SOMEWHAT LAMELY THAT GOS HAD RECOGNIZED GROUP IN THE CAPITAL CITY OF ANGOLA AND WOULD BE HAPPY IF THAT GROUP WERE ENLARGED TO INCLUDE REPRESENTATIVES OF OTHER ELEMENTS. I NOTED DIFFERENCE BETWEEN RECOGNIZING ANGOLA AS A STATE AND RECOGNIZING A PARTICULAR

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GROUP AS ITS GOVERNMENT, NOTABLY WHEN GENERALLY ACCEPTED CRITERIA OF INTERNATIONAL LAW CLEARLY NOT MET. NIMEIRI LAUGHED AND SAID THAT SUCH CRITERIA WERE NOT MET IN A FAIR NUMBER OF OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES EITHER.

5. IN RESPONE TO MY QUESTION, NIMEIRI SAID HIS DELEGATE TO OAU SUMMIT IN ADDIS WOULD BE INSTRUCTED TO SEEK TO PERSUADE MEMBER STATES THAT EXISTING COMMISSION OAU LEADERS FOR ANGOLA SHOULD BE REVIVED. COMMISSION SHOULD BE ASKED TO WORK FOR IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE AND PREPARE THE GROUND FOR A BROADLY BASED REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT THROUGH GENERAL ELECTIONS.

6. COMMENT: DESPITE DIFFERENCE IN SUBSTANCE, OUR MEETING WAS ONE OF MOST CORDIAL I HAVE HAD WITH PRESIDENT NIMEIRI. HE WAS OBVIOUSLY GRATIFIED BY PRESIDENT FORD'S LETTER AND HAD ARRANGED FOR MEDIA COVERAGE OF FACT OF MY CALL. ON ANGOLAN ISSUE ITSELF, HE APPEARED BELIEVE THAT POLICY OF PLAYING ALONG WITH MPLA WOULD BE MORE LIKELY PREVENT DISMEMBERMENT ANGOLA AND ASSURE EVENTUAL ESTABLISHMENT MODERATE REGIME IN LUANDA THAN WOULD ONE OF CONTINUED CONFRONTATION AMONG CONTENDING GROUPS. HE WAS OBVIOUSLY FORTIFIED IN THIS POSITION BY REPORTS OF SOUTH AFRICAN INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA. NIMEIRI'S REMARKS WOULD SEEM IMPLY THAT NIGERIA MAY HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN PUSHING AN ANTI-ZAIRE LINE HERE, BUT WE LACK INFO ON WHICH TO PASS JUDGMENT.
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S/S-O: P. JOHNSON

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ACCRA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE IMMEDIATE

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NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PFOR, AO, US, OAU, SU, TZ, GM, ET, SO

SUBJECT: ANGOLA: ~~CONTINUING~~ DIALOGUE WITH CHIEFS-OF-STATE

FOR AMBASSADOR ONLY

1. ALTHOUGH YOUR HOST GOVERNMENTS HAVE RECOGNIZED MPLA IN ANGOLA WE UNDERSTAND, WITH POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF NIGERIA, THAT THEY EXHIBITED MORE WILLINGNESS THAN OTHER PRO-MPLA AFRICANS TO FIND COMPROMISE IN OAU WHICH COULD HAVE REINJECTED AFRICAN ~~ELEM~~ENT INTO ANGOLAN QUESTION.

2. THEREFORE YOU SHOULD SEEK IMMEDIATE APPOINTMENT WITH CHIEF OF STATE OR HIGHEST APPROPRIATE AUTHORITY TO STATE

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY LR, NARA, DATE 12/17/01

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-- A) AS USG HAS REITERATED AS RECENTLY AS SECRETARY'S PRESS CONFERENCE JANUARY 14 AND IN MEETING WITH AFRICAN CHIEFS OF MISSION JANUARY 15. IT IS PRIMARILY CONCERNED WITH AN AFRICAN SOLUTION TO ANGOLAN PROBLEM AND THE ELIMINATION OF FOREIGN INTERVENTION. IT IS INTERNATIONALIZATION OF CONFLICT WHICH HAS IMPEDED AFRICAN SOLUTION WHICH WE THINK POSSIBLE.

-- B) DESPITE FACT THAT HOST GOVERNMENT HAS RECOGNIZED MPLA WE HAVE PERCEIVED IN OUR TALK WITH YOUR REPRESENTATIVES INTEREST IN A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION WHICH TAKES ALL FACTORS INTO CONSIDERATION RATHER THAN SIMPLY - WHICH FACTION SHOULD RULE ANGOLA.

-- C) WE HAVE NO INTERESTS IN ANGOLA. OUR STATEMENTS REFLECT THIS AND OUR LIMITED ACTIONS DEMONSTRATE THAT OUR AIMS ARE LIMITED TO PROMOTING AND ENCOURAGING A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION.

-- D) THE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA RAN COUNTER TO DETENTE SINCE IT DID NOT REPRESENT SIMPLY AID TO A "NATIONAL LIBERATION" MOVEMENT BUT RATHER AN EFFORT TO IMPOSE A PARTICULAR FACTION IN THE POST-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD. WE CONSIDER THIS INTERVENTION IN AN INTERNAL POLITICAL POWER STRUGGLE A VERY BAD PRECEDENT WITH POTENTIAL DANGEROUS IMPLICATIONS FOR DETENTE POLICY AND FOR PEACE. TO HAVE FAILED TO REACT COULD ONLY ENCOURAGE A REPETITION OF SUCH DANGEROUS BEHAVIOR.

-- E) IT IS PRECISELY BECAUSE WE DO NOT DESIRE TO IMPOSE SUPER-POWER CONFLICTS IN AFRICA BUT RATHER SEEK TO END FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT AND RETURN THE ANGOLAN PROBLEM TO THE AFRICANS FOR A SOLUTION THAT WE ARE SO DISTURBED BY THE SOVIET AND CUBAN DECISION TO SEND AN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE TO AFRICA.

-- F) WE ARE NOT OPPOSED TO MPLA PER SE.

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PAGE 03 STATE 012770

G) WE ARE AWARE OF THE STRONG AFRICAN FEELING ON SOUTH AFRICAN INVOLVEMENT AND, AS PART OF AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT, WE ARE WILLING TO ENCOURAGE THE SOUTH AFRICANS TO LEAVE ANGOLA BEFORE A CUBAN/SOVIET WITHDRAWAL, AS LONG AS THE LATTER FOLLOWS SOON THEREAFTER. WE ARE OPPOSED TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN INVOLVEMENT. (THIS STATEMENT WAS REITERATED BY THE SECRETARY TO THE AFRICAN AMBASSADORS ON JANUARY 15).

5. YOU SHOULD DRAW ON SECRETARY'S PRESS CONFERENCE OF JANUARY 14 (STATE 10223) TO SUPPLEMENT ABOVE.

6. FOR LAGOS: IN VIEW OF ERRATIC NIGERIAN BEHAVIOR ON THIS ISSUE WE LEAVE IT TO YOUR DISCRETION WHETHER TO MAKE ABOVE DEMARCHE AND IN WHAT FORM. KISSINGER

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 974

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E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, AO, DCDOUDAU, SU, TZ, GM, ET, SO
SUBJECT: ANGOLA: CONTINUING DIALOGUE WITH CHIEFS OF STATE

REF: STATE 012770

1. SINCE PRESIDENT NIMEIRI ABSENT FOR MEDICAL CHECK-UP AND FOREIGN MINISTER IS IN CAIRO, AMBASSADOR CARRIED OUT REFTEL INSTRUCTIONS WITH FOREIGN MINISTRY USEC MIRGHANI JAN 19, BEGAN BY GOINGOVER SALIENT POINTS SECRETARY'S JAN 14 PRESS CONFERENCE (STATE 010223) NOTING MASSIVE INPUT SOVIET MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND FACT CUBAN TROOPS DOING VIRTUALLY ALL THE FIGHTING ON THE NORTHERN FRONT. IN LIGHT ALL FACTORS, SECRETARY HAD SAID IT WAS REMARKABLE THAT ONE-HALF OAU STATES SUBSTANTIALLY AGREED WITH OUR PRECEPTION OF ANGOLOAN SITUATION AND THAT USG HOPED DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION COULD BE BUILT AROUND THAT CENTRAL FACT. AMBASSADOR THEN READ PARAS 2A THROUGH G OF REFTEL IN THEIR ENTIRETY.

2. MIRGHANI AFFIRMED IT QUITE CORRECT THAT GOS STILL INTERESTED IN A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION IN ANGOLA WHICH WOULD TAKE ALL FACTORS INTO CONSIDERATION. HE DESCRIBED AS "VERY COMFORTING" PARA 2G STATEMENT ON SOUTH AFRICA, SINCE THIS HAD BEEN CHIEF PROBLEM FOR MOST AFRICANS. GOS UNDERSTOOD USG HAS NOT OPPOSED TO MPLA, ANY MORE THAN GOS OPPOSED TO OTHER TWO ANGOLAN FACTIONS. MIRGHANI WAS EMPHATIC THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR AFRICA IF ANGOLA COULD BE LEFT TO THE AFRICANS. HE FELT THAT TERMINATION ALL FOREIGN INTERVENTION WOULD MAKE SOLUTION TO PROBLEM MUCH EASIER. IN SUM, UNDER SECRETARY DESCRIBED REFTEL

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY HR, NARA, DATE 12/17/01

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AS "VERY ENCOURAGING" AND DESERVING CAREFUL STUDY. IT WOULD BE TRANSMITTED URGENTLY TO FIRST VICE PRESIDENT BAGHIR AS PART GOS CONSIDERATION HOW FAR SUDAN MIGHT BE ABLE TO GO IN RESPONDING TO OUR LATEST MESSAGE. NIMEIRI WOULD ALSO BE INFORMED.

3. COMMENT. WITH PRESIDENT AND FORIGN MINISTER AWAY, EXTENT TO WHICH GOS MAY FEEL IT CAN ACT IN NEXT FEW DAYS IS PROBABLY SMALL. HOWEVER, JUDGING BY MIRGHANI'S COMMENTS, SUDAN WOULD LIKE TO SEE ANGOLAN ISSUE SETTLED ALONG MUCH THE SAME LINES AS WOULD WE. BERLIND

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1215

~~S E C R E T~~ KHARTOUM 0572

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FOR ASST SEC SCHAUFELE

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, AO
SUBJECT: SOVIET-CUBAN PRESENCE IN ANGOLA

REF: STATE 038734

1. HAD CHANCE TO REFER TO REF SUBJECT DURING MEETING WITH FONMIN MAKKAWI FEB 25. TOLD MAKKAWI THAT NIMEIRI HIMSELF HAD STRESSED TO ME EARLY IN YEAR THAT HIS DESIRE STRENGTHEN MPLA MODERATES HAD BEEN FACTOR IN GOS RECOGNITION (KHARTOUM 0021). NOW THAT ANGOLAN MILITARY PHASE SEEMS OVER, I SAID I WONDERED WHETHER ANY THOUGHT BEING GIVEN BY THOSE WHO HAD ACQUIRED INFLUENCE WITH MPLA TO ENCOURAGING AN END OF FOREIGN TROOP PRESENCE, NOTABLY MASSIVE CUBAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

2. MAKKAWI REPLIED GOS CONTINUES BELIEVE ALL FOREIGN FORCES SHOULD LEAVE ANGOLA. SPEAKING SOMEWHAT VAGUELY, HE SAID HE THOUGHT MPLA MIGHT BE URGED BY ITS FRIENDS TO DO NUTHING WHICH MIGHT WEAKEN ITS OWN INDEPENDENT POSITION. HOWEVER, HE GAVE ME NO INDICATION THAT GOS HAS ANY PLAN TO TAKE SUCH AN INITIATIVE ITSELF.

3. COMMENT. WHILE THERE OBVIOUSLY NO HARM IN CONTINUING HOLD THIS PROBLEM BEFORE SUDANESE, I FEAR GOS WILL LET OTHER AFRICANS MAKE A RUNNING ON THIS ONE.

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TO AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE
INFO AMCONSUL ASMARA IMMEDIATE

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 179439

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINS, SU, ET

SUBJECT: CISCO TWO: ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN INFO THROUGH SUDAN

IN VIEW SUCCESS EXPERIENCED IN MAKING CONTACT WITH KID-
NAPPERS OF TENNECO FIVE THROUGH SUDANESE SOURCES, WE BE-
LIEVE TIME HAS COME WHEN WE SHOULD ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN INFOR-
MATION RE CISCO TWO THROUGH THESE SAME CHANNELS. IF
EMBASSY ADDIS HAS NO OBJECTION, DEPARTMENT REQUESTS THAT
EMBASSY KHARTOUM MAKE DISCREET INQUIRY OF GOS, USING SAME
CHANNELS AS BEFORE, TO SEE WHETHER GOS CAN OBTAIN ANY
INFORMATION RE WHEREABOUTS, WELFARE AND PROSPECTS OF RE-
LEASE OF CAMPBELL AND HARRELL. INGERSOLL

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APPROVED BY M - MR. EAGLEBURGER
S/S: JLHOGANSON
AF/E - W.COOTE
S/CCT - R.A.FEAREY
NEA - E.ABINGTON

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY SANA IMMEDIATE
INFO USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL ASMARA IMMEDIATE

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EXDIS

E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS: PINT, PINS, PFOR, ET, US

SUBJECT: KAGNEW 4

REFERENCE: KHARTOUM 2233, JIDDA 6443, DAMASCUS 3692, SANA 2676

1. APPROACHES HAVE NOW BEEN MADE IN KHARTOUM, JIDDA, AND DAMASCUS RE THE UNCONDITIONAL RELEASE OF THE FOUR AMERICANS HELD IN ERITREA. RESPONSES HAVE BEEN POSITIVE, ALTHOUGH VARYING IN DEGREE.

2. ADDIS ABABA HAS BEEN ASKED NOT TO RAISE ISSUE OF USG

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HR 12/17/01

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PAGE 02 STATE 226186

APPROACHES AS DESCRIBED ABOVE WITH THE EPMG SINCE DEPARTMENT FEELS TO DO SO MIGHT DILUTE DEGREE TO WHICH EPMG FEELS WE HOLD THEM RESPONSIBLE FOR THE UNCONDITIONAL RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES. SHOULD THE ETHIOPIAN AUTHORITIES RAISE ISSUE, WE HAVE ASKED ADDIS ABABA TO SEEK GUIDANCE RE THE APPROPRIATENESS OF INFORMING THEM OF OTHER STEPS TAKEN THUS FAR.

3. FOR KHARTOUM, JIDDA, AND DAMASCUS: WOULD APPRECIATE EMBASSY COMMENTS REGARDING THE ADVISABILITY OF INFORMING HOST GOVERNMENTS ON AN IF ASKED BASIS OF USG'S OTHER APPROACHES TO DATE. FURTHERMORE, IS THE EPMG LIKELY TO HEAR OF USG EFFORTS THUS FAR FROM HOST GOVERNMENTS?

4. FOR SANA: YARG OFFER OF ASSISTANCE MOST WELCOME. WOULD APPRECIATE COMMENTS PER PARA 3 ABOVE. INGERSOLL

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INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMCONSUL ASMARA IMMEDIATE
USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 229773

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINS, PFOR, ET, US

SUBJECT:KAGNEW FOUR

REFS: A. STATE 227375 (NOTAL); B. BEIRUT 11934

1. EMBASSY SHOULD APPROACH GOS IN AS ROUTINE AND LOW KEY MANNER AS POSSIBLE AND SEEK NORMAL FACILITATIVE ASSISTANCE IN ISSUANCE OF WEBSTER VISA. IF ASKED, EMBASSY SHOULD INDICATE IT BELIEVES THAT WEBSTER IS TRAVELING AS A PRIVATE JOURNALIST AND MAY ATTEMPT TO CONTACT KAGNEW FOUR. THERE SHOULD, HOWEVER, BE NO INDICATION THAT THE USG IS IN ANY WAY INVOLVED IN WEBSTER'S PLANS. KISSINGER

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S/S :RKUCHEL
M - MR. EGAN
AF/E - MR. COOTE

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O 360000Z SEP 75
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY SANA IMMEDIATE
USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL ASMARA IMMEDIATE

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EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS:PINS, PFOR, US

SUBJECT: KAGNEW FOUR

REFS: A. JIDDA 6537; B. SANA 2682; C. KHARTOUM 2241;
D. DAMASCUS 3722; E. GENEVA 7261; F. STATE 225074

1. IN LIGHT REFTELS, ALL ACTION ADDRESSEES ARE AUTHORIZED TO INFORM HOST GOVERNMENTS, AND ICRC, ON IF-ASKED BASIS RE APPROACHES TO THE OTHER HOST GOVERNMENTS AND ICRC, WHILE NATURALLY ESCHEWING ANY DETAILED DISCUSSION OF APPROACHES.
2. FOR JIDDA: AS NOTED STATE 225074, DEPARTMENT OFFICER

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PAGE 02 STATE 229659

RAISED SUBJECT OF OBTAINING SAG ASSISTANCE IN RELEASE OF HOSTAGES WITH AMBASSADOR NURI IBRAHAM. DEPARTMENT IS ENDEAVORING TO CONTACT AMBASSADOR IBRAHAM AGAIN TO FOLLOW UP ON THIS INITIAL APPROACH. KISSINGER

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W
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P 111100Z SEP 74
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8758

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 KHARTOUM 2100

EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 State Dept Review
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES HR 9/27/02
BY HR, NARA, DATE 6/16/03

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, SU, US
SUBJ: FURTHER US POLICY TOWARD THE SUDAN

REF: STATE 169610

1. SUMMARY: ELEVEN WEEKS HAVE PASSED SINCE THE SUDANESE RELEASED THE PALESTINIAN TERRORISTS AND AMBASSADOR BREWER WAS RECALLED IN CONSEQUENCE. WITH THE AMBASSADOR NOW COMPLETING HOME LEAVE, DEPT. WILL PRESUMABLY BE REVIEWING DECISIONS DESCRIBED IN REFTEL, INCLUDING QUESTION OF AMBASSADOR'S RETURN TO POST. THIS MESSAGE ATTEMPTS TO ASSESS THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OUR POLICY TO DATE AND ADVANCES SUGGESTIONS FOR POSSIBLE FUTURE STEPS. IN BRIEF, AMBASSADOR'S RETURN TO KHARTOUM SHOULD BE PRECEDED BY, AND CONDITIONED UPON THE RESULTS OF, A MEETING BETWEEN CHARGE' AND A SENIOR SUDANESE OFFICIAL. ALTERNATIVELY, AMBASSADOR COULD RETURN FOR EXPLORATORY TALKS HIMSELF. IN EITHER CASE, WE SHOULD NOW OPENLY DISCUSS OUR PROBLEMS. US MUST DECIDE WHETHER ITS INTERESTS ARE SERVED BY MAINTAINING ITS CURRENT POSTURE. END SUMMARY.

2. IF THE POLICIES AS LAID OUT IN STATE 169610 WERE FULLY APPROPRIATE TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE MANNER IN WHICH WE COMMUNICATED THEM TO (OR IN FACT CONCEALED THEM FROM) THE SUDANESE MAKES IT DIFFICULT TO WEIGH THEIR IMPACT. WE HAVE CERTAINLY KEPT THEM GUESSING. SEVERAL DIPLOMATS

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HAVE PROBED ABOUT AMBASSADOR BREWER'S RETURN AND ABOUT THE FUTURE OF US ASSISTANCE HERE, SOME OF THEM UNDOUBTEDLY ACTING ON BEHALF OF THE SUDANESE. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS, CHARGE' HAS SAID THAT THE AMBASSADOR'S FUTURE IS STILL SUBJECT TO REVIEW AND THAT ASSISTANCE IS COMPATIBLE WITH NEITHER THE DECISION TO RELEASE THE CONVICTED MURDERERS OF US DIPLOMATS NOR THE MANNER IN WHICH IT WAS MADE.

3. OUR ONLY TALKS WITH SUDANESE OFFICIALS ON US-SUDANESE RELATIONS WERE REPORTED IN KHARTOUM 1795 AND 1926. IF WE EXPECTED EXPRESSIONS OF OVERWHELMING REMORSE OR APOLOGY, NONE WERE FORTHCOMING. INSTEAD, OFFICIALS EXPLAINED THEIR POSITION IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS: THE DECISION TO RELEASE THE TERRORISTS WAS PAINFUL AND IN NO WAY DIMINISHED SUDANESE HORROR AND SORROW OVER THE MURDERS OR THEIR RESPECT AND ADMIRATION FOR THE VICTIMS; POLITICAL IMPERATIVES INSEPARABLE FROM PARTICIPATION IN THE ARAB WORLD COMPELLED NIMEIRI TO TAKE THE DECISION HE DID; AND IMPRISONMENT OF THE TERRORISTS WOULD SURELY HAVE LED TO A FURTHER LOSS OF LIVES THROUGH RETALIATION. THESE OFFICIALS AND DIPLOMATS FRIENDLY TO THE ARAB CAUSE PLED FOR UNDERSTANDING ON THE PART OF THE US AND NOTED THAT THE SUDAN WAS NOT ALONE IN HAVING BEEN PRESSURED INTO RELEASING TERRORISTS. ANOTHER COMMON THEME HAS BEEN THE CLAIM THAT THE KHARTOUM TERRORISTS DID NOT GO TOTALLY UNPUNISHED, HAVING BEEN DETAINED FOR SIXTEEN MONTHS PENDING A TRIAL IN WHICH THEY WERE FOUND GUILTY AND SEVERE PENALTIES WERE IMPOSED. THIS HAS BEEN PICTURED AS STERNER TREATMENT THAN THAT METED OUT BY OTHER GOVERNMENTS WITH CAPTURED TERRORISTS ON THEIR HANDS. FINALLY, AS DEPT. AWARE, SUDANESE DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, WHICH THEY SAY WAS CARRIED TO ITS CONCLUSION, AND THE EXECUTIVE ACTION TAKEN BY NIMEIRI.

4. WE HAVE OF COURSE HAD NO CONTACT WITH FOREIGN MINISTER KHALID SINCE AMBASSADOR BREWER'S MEETING WITH HIM PRIOR TO THE LATTER'S RECALL. IF WE ARE TO CREDIT THE STORY GIVEN CHARGE' BY THE IRANIAN AMBASSADOR (KHARTOUM 1866), KHALID IS NOT INCLINED TO CONVEY ANY PARTICULAR REGRET OVER THE RELEASE OF THE TERRORISTS.

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ACCORDING TO A MORE RECENT BUT UNSUBSTANTIATED REPORT, KHALID WAS ANOYED UPON LEARNING THAT EXIM WOULD NOT FURTHER FINANCE IMPORTS IN WHICH SUDANESE HRE VITALLY INTERESTED (BOEING 737S AND GE LOCOMOTIVES). KHALID ALLEGEDLY WERE TOYING WITH THE IDEA OF ASKING THE SAUDIS TO CONVEY SUDANESE DISPLEASURE TO US OFFICIALS. HE IN FACT DID VISIT JIDDA ON AUGUST 27-28, AND NIMEIRI RECEIVED THE NEW SAUDI AMBASSADOR ON AUGUST 27, BOTH EVENTS OCCURRING SHORTLY BEFORE THE SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON, BUT WE HAVE NO INFORMATION HERE TO INDICATE THAT THE SAUDIS AGREED TO ACT AS A CONDUIT.

5. THE ONLY HARD FACT TO BE FLEANED FROM THE FOREGOING IS THAT KHALID DID GET THE MESSAGE ABOUT THE EXIM CUTOFF. THIS WOULD EXPLAIN THE END OF EARLIER OPTIMISTIC, OR TRIAL BALLOON, PRESS REPORTS CONCERNING US BUSINESS ACTIVITIES IN THE SUDAN AND EXIM FINANCING (KHARTOUM 1819 AND 1826). AS OF AUGUST 26, HOWEVER, TWO LOCAL AMBASSADORS HAD TOLD CHARGE! THAT THE SUDANESE WERE WONDERING WHETHER PRESIDENT FORD WOULD REPLY TO NIMEIRI'S LETTER OF CONGRATULATIONS (KHARTOUM 1853) AND, IF NOT, WHY. (NIMEIRI'S LETTER RECEIVED WIDE PRESS COVERAGE HERE.) FINALLY, AS DEPT. WILL RECALL, ON AUGUST 1 THE FOREIGN MINISTRY WITHOUT BLINKING REQUESTED AGREMENT TO THE APPOINTMENT OF A NEW AMBASSADOR TO WASHINGTON (KHARTOUM 1796).

6. THE NEAREST THING WE HAVE IN THE WAY OF SUDANESE RECOGNITION THAT SOMETHING MORE IS REQUIRED OF THEM COMES FROM A TALK WE HAD ON SEPT. 5 WITH THE DIRECTOR OF CHURCH WORLD SERVICE AFRICA (VAN HOOGSTRATEN), WHO SAID HE HAD INFORMALLY EXPLORED WITH THE MINISTER OF INFORMATION AND VICE PRESIDENT ALIER HOW US-SUDANESE RELATIONS MIGHT BE PUT ON A BETTER FOOTING. REPORTEDLY, THE SUDANESE OFFICIALS AGREED THAT THE NEXT MOVE WAS UP TO THEM BUT WERE AT A LOSS AS TO WHAT TO DO, ALTHEOUGH THERE SURFACED THE IDEA, NOT FURTHER PURSUED, THAT ALIER COULD GO TO WASHINGTON FOR TALKS WITH US OFFICIALS.

7. IN THE ABSENCE OF UNFORESEEN FOLLOW-UP TO THIS VAGUE PROPOSAL, ALL OF THE AGOVE SUGGESTS THAT WE CAN EXPECT LITTLE MORE IN THE WAY OF APOLOGY, EXPLANATION OR EXPRESSIONS OF

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CONTRITION ON A PURELY VOLUNTARY BASIS. SUDANESE OFFICIALS BELIEVE THAT THE RELEASE OF THE TERRORISTS WAS POLITICALLY NECESSARY AND PROVIDED NEEDED INSURANCE AGAINST PALESTINIAN REPRISALS. WITH THAT DECISION MADE, THEY SURELY CALCULATED THAT INFORMING XI IN ADVANCE OF THE RELEASE WOULD HAVE SUBJECTED THEM TO THE STRONGEST COUNTER-PRESSURES. THEY MAY HAVE ALSO MADE A JUDGMENT THAT US-SUDANESE RELATIONS WOULD SUFFER LESS IN THE AFTERMATH OF RELEASE THAN FROM DRASTIC THREATS FROM A FOREWARNED US GOVERNMENT. IN ANY EVENT, WE CAN ASSUME THEY DECIDED THAT THEY COULD NOT GET ALONG WITHOUT THE ARABS; US FRIENDETIP AND COOPERATION WEERE COMPARATIVELY, BUT ONLY COMPARATIVELY, EXPENDABLE.
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FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8759

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 KHARTOUM 02100

EXDIS

OUR
POLICY IN THE FUTURE SHOULD PERHAPS BE FASHIONED
IN ANSWER TO A DIFFERENT QUESTION: DO WE WANT THE SUDAN TO
GET ALONG WITHOUT US? ADMITTEDLY, THE SUDAN IS IN A WAY A
HALF-BREED POOR BOY OF THE ARAB WORLD, AND IT THEREFORE
WILL NEVER HAVE A LOUD VOICE IN LARGER REGIONAL EVENTS OF
INTEREST TO THE US. IN THAT CONTEXT, AND IN THE ABSENCE OF
UNEXPECTED DOMESTIC UPHEAVAL OR RADICAL CHANGE WROUGHT
FROM WITHOUT, THE GOVERNMENT WILL CONTINUE TO (A) FOLLOW
THE MODERATE LEAD OF EGYPT RATHER THAN THE REVOLUTIONARY
SIREN SONG OF LIBYA, (B) STAY ON THE GOOD SIDE OF ITS OIL-RICH
MUSLIM BENEFACTORS TO THE NORTHEAST, AND (C) OPPOSE COMMUNIST
INFLUENCE AT HOME AND FEAR IT ELSEWHERE IN
THE NEIGHBORHOOD. ON THE LAST POINT, THEY ARE UNDOUBTEDLY
WARY OF RECENT SOVIET INROADS IN SOMALIA AND REPORTED
SOVIET AND CHINESE COMPETITION FOR THE RIGHT TO SUPPLY
ARMS TO ETHIOPIA, WHERE INTERNAL EVENTS ARE THEMSELVES
WORRISOME. IT IS OUR ASSUMPTION THAT THE US WANTS THE
SUDANESE TO KEEP THINKING ALONG THESE FOREIGN POLICY LINES.

9. BEFORE POSING SOME US POLICY OPTIONS, WE WOULD POINT
OUT THAT IN ONE AREA THE SUDANESE HAVE RECENTLY BEEN OF
GREAT ASSISTANCE TO US, AND THIS ASSISTANCE HAS SURVIVED
THE PARTIAL BREACH IN BILATERAL RELATIONS BROUGHT ON BY THE
RELEASE OF THE TERRORISTS. WITHOUT THE INTERMEDIARY AND
SOMETIMES MORE DIRECT ROLE PLAYED BY SUDANESE OFFICIALS,
THE IMPENDING RELEASE OF THE TENNECO AND UN HOSTAGES
HELD BY THE ERITREAN LIBERATION FRONT IN ETHIOPIA WOULD BE

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HIGHLY DOUBTFUL. SUDANESE SECURITY SERVICES SURFACED A MAJOR LONG-STANDING ELF SOURCE OF INFORMATION ON MATTERS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THEM IN THE INTEREST OF HELPING AN AMERICAN COMPANY AND THE EMBASSY NEGOTIATE THE RELEASE. THE SOURCE HAS BEEN COMPROMISED, BUT THE ASSISTANCE CONTINUES. IT IS WORTH NOTING THAT FIRST VICE PRESIDENT AL-BAGHIR PERSONALLY AUTHORIZED SUDANESE COOPERATION ON THIS CASE AND THAT CHEIF OF PULBIC SECURITY ABDEL WAHAB KEEPS HIM AND NIMEIRI INFORMED OF PROGRESS ON A REGULAR BASIS. WE WILL WANT OFFICIALLY (AND PRIVATELY) TO EXPRESS OUR GRATITUDE AT AN APPROPRIATE LEVEL AFTER THE RELEASE TAKES PLACE.

10. THERE ARE FOUR POSSIBLE POLICY OPTIONS, LISTED BELOW WITH PROBABLE SUDANESE REACTIONS.

A. NOT SATISFIED WITH THE SUDANESE RESPONSE, I.E., THEIR FAILURE TO COME FORWARD WITH SOMETHING BETTER IN THE WAY OF AN EXPLANATION FOR THEIR ACTIONS, WE TAKE ADDITIONAL STEPS TO EXPRESS OUR DISPLEASURE, E.G, ANNOUNCEMENT THAT THE AMBASSADOR WILL NOT RETURN. THE SUDANESE PROBABLY FEEL THE NEED TO RETALIATE IN KIND AND WITHDRAW THEIR REQUEST FOR AGREMENT. ADDITIONAL STEPS COULD BE TAKEN AS WELL.

B. FOR THE SAME REASON, WE MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO WITH NO ANNOUNCEMENT AND LET OUR DISPLEASURE CONTINUE TO SINK IN SLOWLY. THE SUDANESE, WHO ARE AWARE THAT THE AMBASSADOR HAS BEEN ON HOME LEAVE AMONG OTHER THINGS AND WHO EXPECT HIM BACK, BEGIN TO REALIZE HOW SERIOUSLY WE VIEW MATTERS BUT DECIDE TO WAIT US OUT FOR A FEW MONTHS.

C. THE AMBASSADOR RETURNS TO POST EMPTY-HANDED AND WITH NO PUBLICITY AND INFORMS THE SUDANESE OF OUR POSITION, I.E, WE MAINTAIN OUR HOLD ON AID AND COOPERATION. THE SUDANESE FIRST FORESEE A RETURN TO NORMALCY, THEN CORRECT THEMSELVES AND AGAIN WAIT IT OUT.

D. THE AMBASSADOR RETURNS, HOLDS A ROUND OF TALKS WITH SENIOR OFFICIALS, AND MAKES HIS RECOMMENDATIONS TO WASHINGTON. THE SUDANESE WAIT IT OUT.

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11. BASED ON THE SITUATION AND POSSIBILITIES AS SEEN FROM HERE (PARA 3-9 ABOVE), WE BELIEVE THAT OPTION D BEST SERVES OVERALL US INTERESTS. ITS DRAWBACK IS THAT, FAILING A SATISFACTORY RESPONSE FROM SUDANESE LEADERS TO THE AMBASSADOR'S APPROACHES, WE WOULD BE LEFT WITH THE CHOICE OF WITHDRAWING HIM AGAIN, WITH THE PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF OPTION A., OR FINDING OURSELVES IN THE POSITION PICTURED IN OPTION C., WHICH WE BELIEVE DOES NOT IMPROVE AS OPTION B.

12. AS AN ALTERNATIVE, IN OUR VIEW PREFERABLE, TO THE AMBASSADORS RETURN AS IN OPTION D., AND TO AVOID THE PITFALLS OF THAT CHOICE, THE CHARGE' COULD ON INSTRUCTIONS REQUEST AN APPOINTMENT WITH A SENIOR OFFICIAL WITH THE PURPOSE OF FULLY EXPLAINING OUR POLICY AS STATED IN STATE 169610 AND EXPLORING SUDANESE WILLINGNESS TO TAKE APPROPRIATE MEASURES PREREQUISITE TO THE RESUMPTION OF NORMAL RELATIONS, INCLUDING THE AMBASSADOR'S RETURN. THE BEST CHOICES FOR SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD BE FOREIGN MINISTER KHALID OR FIRST VICE-PRESIDENT AL-BAGHIR. THE LATTER IS PERHAPS A BETTER CHOICE SINCE IT IS HE WHO IS TO BE THANKED FOR SUDANESE ASSISTANCE ON THE TENNECO CASE, IF THE DEPT AGREES SUCH ACTION ON OUR PART BOTH IS APPROPRIATE AND SHOULD BE TAKEN IN CONJUNCTION WITH A BROADER DEMARCHE.

13. CONSIDERATION OF RESUMPTION OF AID OR EXCHANGE PROGRAMS WOULD OF COURSE HAVE TO FOLLOW A SATISFACTORY RESOLUTION OF THE CURRENT IMPASSE, AND THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ARE PURELY PRELIMINARY. THERE ARE AREAS OF COOPERATION WHERE OUT INTERESTS ARE SERVED AS MUCH AS OR MORE THAN THE SUDANESE INTEREST, AND IT IS HERE THAT WE MIGHT FIRST REVIEW OUR CURRENT STANCE: EDUCATIONAL, CULTURAL AND INFORMATIONAL EXCHANGES, WHICH EXPOSE THE SUDANESE TO AMERICAN VALUES AND VIEWS; PARTICIPANT TRAINING; FOR THE SAME REASON; TRADE AND INVESTMENT ASSISTANCE THAT SUPPORTS VENTURES THAT ARE OF POTENTIAL COMMERCIAL BENEFIT TO AMERICAN FIRMSOR THAT ARE ADVANTAGEOUSL FROM A BOP AND BALANCE OF TRADE POINT OF VIEW; AND TRAINING FOR CAREFULLY SELECTED INDIVIDUALS IN US SECURITY AND MILITARY COURSES OR SCHOOLS. WHILE THE ASSIGNMENT OF A DEFENSE ATTACHE' WOULD SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASE OUR ABILITY TO KEEP TABS ON THE WORKINGS AND

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POLICIES OF A MILITARY REGIME, IT MIGHT BE TOO ATTRACTIVE TO THE SUDANESE (NIMEIRI IN PARTICULAR) TO CONSIDER AT AN EARLY STAGE. WE STRONGLY URGE, HOWEVER, THAT THE NEW JUNIOR OFFICER SLOT PROVISIONALLY ALLOTTED TO THE EMBASSY BE RETAINED; IT WILL GO UNNOTICED LOCALLY BUT ENHANCE OUR SUBSTANTIVE CAPABILITY CONSIDERABLY.

14. THIS MESSAGE IS WRITTEN WITHOUT THE BENEFIT OF RECENT HARD INFORMATION ON THREE POTENTIALLY IMPORTANT AND RELEVANT MATTERS: THE CURRENT LOCATION AND CONDITION OF THE KHARTOUM TERRORISTS (SEE KHARTOUM 1074); THE STATUS OF DISCUSSIONS WITH THE EGYPTIANS (IF ANY) ON THAT SUBJECT; AND THE CURRENT MOOD OF CONGRESS AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC WITH RESPECT TO THE SUDAN'S RELEASE OF THE TERRORISTS.

15. COUNTRY TEAM CONCURS.
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ACTION SS-25

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FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 226
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL ASMARA NIACT IMMEDIATE

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ KHARTOUM 1878

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINT, PINS, ET
SUBJECT: CISCO TWO: INTERVIEW WITH AMERICAN PRISONERS

1. FRENCH AMBASSADOR THIS MORNING ASKED CHARGE TO CALL AND THEN INTRODUCED CHARGE TO LUCIEN BITTERLIN AS SECRETARY GENERAL OF "ASSOCIATION DE SOLIDAITE FRANCO-ARABE" AND DIRECTOR OF ASSOCIATION'S MONTHLY MAGAZINE CALLED "FRANCE PAYS ARABE." BITTERLIN HAS JUST ARRIVED KHARTOUM ACCOMPANIED BY PLF REPEAT PLF REPRESENTATIVE WHO ACCOMPANIED HIM DURING RECENT TRAVEL THROUGH ERITREA.

2. BITTERLIN SAID THAT ON AUGUST 5 HE HAD INTERVIEWED AMERICAN PRISONERS CAMPBELL AND HARRELL AT A PLF CAMP APPROXIMATELY MIDWAY BETWEEN NAKFA AND ALGHENA IN NORTHERN ERITREA. BITTERLIN ESTIMATED THAT CAMP WAS 100 KILOMETERS FROM SUDANESE BORDER.

3. BITTERLIN SAID THAT THE TWO AMERICANS WERE IN GOOD HEALTH AND WELL CARED FOR. AERIAL BOMBING BY ETHIOPIAN FORCES HAD OCCURRED AUGUST 3 BUT WITHOUT DAMAGE TO CAMP. HE SAID THAT HE WAS UNABLE TO JUDGE FROM THE APPEARANCE OF THE CAMP WHETHER THE PLF UNIT HAD ANY IMMEDIATE TRAVEL PLANS.

4. BITTERLIN CONDUCTED A BRIEF INTERIEW WITH

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CAMPBELL AND HARRELL AND WILL PLAY THE TAPE FOR CHARGE LATER THIS AFTERNOON. HE IS MOST RELUCTANT TO SURRENDER THE TAPE OR ALLOW US TO COPY IT, SINCE HE IS RETURNING TO PARIS ON AUGUST 15 AND MAY BE ABLE TO PLACE INTERVIEW IN FRENCH PRESS.

5. BITTERLIN ALSO HANDED CHARGE UNSEALED LETTER FROM CAMPBELL TO HIS WIFE IN ASMARA WHICH BEING POUCHED ASMARA AUGUST 14. CAMPBELL WRITES THAT HE AND HARRELL ARE EATING WELL, ARE IN GOOD HEALTH AND ARE TREATED VERY WELL. HE CHARACTERIZES THE FORCES HOLDING THEM AS "HELPFUL AND HUMANE." HE CONTINUES TO SAY THAT THE "FIGHTERS ARE VERY GOOD PEOPLE AND VERY CONCERNED FOR OUR NEEDS. THEY HAVE GONE OUT OF THEIR WAY TO INSURE OUR EVERY NEED." CAMPBELL'S LETTER STATES THAT PARTY SPENT FIRST 12 DAYS AFTER CAPTURE TRAVELLING CONTINUALLY BY FOOT BUT THEY HAD BEEN RELATIVELY STATIONARY DURING SUBSEQUENT 11 DAYS (UP TO AUGUST 5).

6. WILL CABLE CONTENTS OF TAPED INTERVIEW LATER TODAY.
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O 131557Z AUG 75
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 0233
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL ASMARA NIACT IMMEDIATE

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ KHARTOUM 1887

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINT, PINS, ET
SUBJ: CISCO TWO: INTERVIEW WITH AMERICAN PRISONERS

REF: KHARTOUM 1878

1. AUGUST 5 INTERVIEW OF CAMPBELL AND HARRELL BY FRENCH JOURNALIST BITTERLIN (REFTEL) CONTAINS FOLLOWING HIGHLIGHTS.

2. HARRELL IDENTIFIED SELF AS 40 YEARS OLD, TRANSMITTER OPERATOR, RESIDENT OF ASMARA SINCE 1967, BEFORE WHICH HE SERVED IN US ARMY. CAMPBELL SAID HE 27 YEARS OLD, TRANSMITTER SUPERVISOR IN ASMARA FOR FOURTEEN MONTHS AND PREVIOUSLY IN US NAVY IN SPAIN AND ON BOARD SHIP IN MEDITERRANEAN. BOTH ANSWERED IN NEGATIVE
WHEN ASKED WHETHER THEY HAD SERVED IN VIETNAM. BOTH SAID THEY WERE CIVILIAN CONTRACTORS TO US NAVY.

2. CAMPBELL SAID THERE WERE FIFTY AMERICAN CIVILIANS AND TEN NAVY PEOPLE, INCLUDING ONE OFFICER, AT KAGNEW. HE SAID ROLE OF STATION IS TO SUPPORT US NAVY AND ADDED: "WE HAVE EQUIPMENT TO SUPPORT STATE DEPARTMENT AIRPLANES FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER AND THE PRESIDENT".

3. BOTH MEN SIAD THEY DID NOT KNOW WHY THEY WERE KIDNAPPED. ASKED WHAT THEY THINK ABOUT THE SITUATION IN ERITREA, CAMPBELL

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SAID THAT INFORMATION ON THE MATTER WAS NOT AVAILABLE TO HIM IN ASMARA AND THAT AMERICAN ENCYCLOPEDIA TREAT ETHIOPIA AS A WHOLE. CAMPBELL ADDED THAT THE PEOPLE IN ASMARA TRY TO REPORT CONDITIONS THERE BUT THE NEWS DOESN'T GET OUT TO THE WORLD.

4. INTERVIEWER ASKED WHETHER PRISONERS KNEW THAT USG HELPING ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT AGAINST THE PEOPLE OF ERITREA. CAMPBELL REPLIED "I DO NOW" BUT THEN SAID HE HAD NOT KNOWN BEFORE: "USG NEVER ANNOUNCED IT".

5. BOTH MEN DENIED THEY WORKED FOR THE CIA. TO QUESTION ABOUT NUMBER OF CIA AGENTS THERE ARE IN ASMARA, CAMPBELL SAID: "IF THERE IS ANYONE FROM CIA IN ASMARA, WE SHOULDN'T KNOW ABOUT IT. IF WE DID, HE WOULDN'T BE A VERY GOOD CIA AGENT".

6. CAMPBELL SAID THEY HAD BEEN TREATED WELL, ALTHOUGH THEY HAD HAD ONLY ORANGES TO EAT FOR THE FIRST TWO DAYS.

7. COMMENT: BITTERLIN TOLD US THAT HE WAS PUSHED TO ASK QUESTIONS ABOUT USG AID TO EPMG AND CIA BY PLF OFFICIALS PRESENT AT INTERVIEW. THIS IS EVIDENT FROM TAPE. INTERVIEW WAS CONDUCTED IN ENGLISH, ALTHOUGH BITTERLIN'S ENGLISH IS MINIMAL AND HE SPOKE TO PLF OFFICIALS IN FRENCH.
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O 131558Z AUG 75
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 0234
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL ASMARA NIACT IMMEDIATE

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ KHARTOUM 1888

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS PINT ET
SUBJ: CISCO TWO: PLF CHIEF STATES TWO DEMANDS FOR RELEASE
OF AMERICAN PRISONERS

REF: KHARTOUM 1878

1. FRENCH JOURNALIST BITTERLIN PLAYED FOR CHARGE PORTIONS OF AMR INTERVIEW TAPED ON AUGUST 5 WITH ISSAYAS AFWARKI, PRESIDENT OF PLF OF THE INTERIOR.

2. INTERVIEWER ASKED AFWARKI WHAT PLF WANTED TO PROVE BY THE KIDNAPPING. AFWARKI REPLIED THAT THE KIDNAPPING HAD BEEN DONE IN ORDER TO CALL ATTENTION TO US AID TO THE "SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT" IN ADDIS. HE ADDED THAT THE ARMS, BOMBS AND PLANES USED BY THE GOVERNMENT ARE AMERICAN.

3. ASKED WHAT THE PLF WANTS NOW, AFWARKI SAID THERE ARE TWO DEMANDS: RELEASE BY THE ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT OF ERITREAN PRISONERS (HE SAID PLF KNEW OF THREE HUNDRED BUT BELIEVED THERE WERE MANY MORE); AND PAYMENT BY THE US GOVERNMENT OF A RANSOM (AMOUNT NOT YET DECIDED).

4. COMMENT: INTERVIEW TOOK PLACE WITHIN A FEW MILES OF THE CAMP WHERE CAMPBELL AND HARRELL ARE HELD. BITTERLIN COULD NOT EXPLAIN WHY PLF HAD NOT ADVERTISED THEIR DEMANDS.

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PAGE 01 KHARTO 02233 221329Z

41
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 AS-01 /027 W
064817

O P 221225Z SEP 75
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 435
INFO AMEMBASSY ASMARA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY

~~S E C R E T~~ KHARTOUM 2233

EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.5 State Dept Review
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES HR 9/27/02
BY HR NARA DATE 6/16/03

PLEASE PASS TO USDEL NEW YORK

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINT, SU, ET
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR SUDANESE ASSISTANCE IN OBTAINING
RELEASE OF CISCO II AND KAGNEW II

REF: USDEL SECTO 13001

BEGIN SUMMARY: IN RESPONSE APPROACH AUTHORIZED REFTEL, SENIOR MINSTATE AT PRESIDENCY TOLD AMBASSADOR SEPT 22 THAT HE DEPLORED TERRORIST ACTIONS SUCH AS THOSE INVOLVING CICSO II AND KAGNEW II. HE PROMISED EXAMINE QUESTION URGENTLY AND HOPED WAY COULD BE FOUND FOR GOS TO BE HELPFUL IN SECURING RELEASE HOSTAGES. END SUMMARY.

1. IN ABSENCE FROM COUNTRY OF BOTH VP BAGHIR AND PRESIDENCY SECGEN AL KHIDER (WHO AS MININT FACILITATED GOS COOPERATION IN TENNECO CASE) I ASKED SEE MINSTATE PRESIDENTIAL AFFAIRS FAISAL MUHAMMED ABDEL RAHMAN AL-KIBEIDA ON RECEIPT REFTEL MORNING SEPT 22 AND WAS RECEIVED IMMEDIATELY. BECAUSE KIBEIDA IS NIMEIRI'S HONCHO FOR FLOOD RELIEF OPEDYLIONS, I BEGAN BY OUTLINING STEPS USG CONTEMPLATING WITH RESPECT THIS HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE. KIBEIDA EXPRESSED APPRECIATION AND INDICATED

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HELP CONTINUED BE BADLY NEEDED.

2. I THEN SAID THAT, IN OUR TURN, WE WISHED SOLICIT GOS HELP ON SIMILAR HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS. KEY ROLE IN FACILITATING RELEASE TENNECO HOSTAGES YEAR AGO HAD BEEN DEEPLY APPRECIATED IN WASHINGTON. WE WERE NOW FACED WITH SIMILAR SITUATION INVOLVING FOUR AMERICAN CITIZENS, TWO OF THEM USG EMPLOYEES. IN LIGHT PUBLIC ASSURANCES PLF LEADER SABBE, WE HAD EARLIER ASSUMED CISCO II WOULD BE RELEASED UNCONDITIONALLY BUT SEPT 12 CAPTURE TWO ADDITIONAL AMERICANS MADE IT CLEAR THIS NOT PLF INTENTION. I THEN RECALLED TO KIBEIDA OUR STANDARD POLICY AGAINST ACCEDING TO TERRORIST DEMANDS OR OTHERWISE NEGOTIATING ON RELEASE OF HOSTAGES. AT SAEM TIME, WE WERE NATURALLY CONCERNED RE SAFETY AMERICAN CITIZENS. IN ADDITION OBVIOUS HUMANITARIAN REASONS, AS WELL AS DEVELOPING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN USG AND GOS, SUDAN'S SPECIAL POSITION STEMMING FROM NIMEIRI'S CONTINUING MEDIATION EFFORTS APPEAR TO US TO PUT GOS IN EXCELLENT POSITION TO BE OF SPECIAL HELP IN CONVINCING ELF/PLF TO RELEASE THESE FOUR AMERICANS PROMPTLY AND UNCONDITIONALLY. WHILE SUDANESE WOULD NO DOUBT HAVE OWN IDEAS HOW TO PROCEED, IT COULD WELL BE POINTED OUT TO ERITREANS THAT, IF THEY DESIRED FAVORAZPE INTERNATIONAL PUBLICITY FOR THEIR CAUSE, KIDNAPPING ACTION IS CERTAINLY NOT THE WAY TO OBTAIN IT. I CONCLUDED BY NOTING THAT MY INSTRUCTIONS HAD COME DIRECTLY FROM THE SECJETARY'S DELEGATION IN NEW YORK, AND SAID THAT USG WOULD OBVIOUSLY APPRECIATE ANYTHING GOS MIGHT DO TO BE HELPFUL.

3. KIBEIDA REACTED POSITIVELY. HE DEPLORED TERRORISM AND AGREED ERITREANS WOULD APPEAR GAIN NOTHING BY CONTINUING HOLD INNOCENT HOSTAGES. HE ASKED WHETHER USG HAD APPROACHED OTHER GOVERNMENTS AND IF PLF HADIMADE ANY DEMANDS. I REPLIED UNDERSTOOD SAUDIS ALSO BEING APPROACHED BUT IT WAS FELT SUDAN PARTICULARLY WELL PLACED VIEW NIMEIRI'S MAJOR MEDIATION EFFORTS. AS TO PLF DEMANDS, NUMBER HAD BEENREFERRED TO IN MEDIA BUT I WAS UNAWARE THAT WE HAD RECEIVED ANYTHING AUTHORITATIVE. KIBEIDA SAID HE HOPED GOS COULD BE HELPFUL. NOTING MATTER OF SOME URGENCY, I COMMENTED PERSONALLY TO KIBEIDA THAT I UNDERSTOODN"MEDIA" HAD REPORTED EXECUTIONS MIGHT TAKE PLACE OCTOBER 3 IF DEMANDS NOT MET (CF ASMARA 0798). ADDED THAT THERE SHOULD OF COURSE BE NO REFERENCE TO USG

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APPROACH IN ANY GOS CONTACTS WITH ERITREANS. KIBEIDA AGREED.

4. COMMENT: IN ABSENCE BOTH BAGHIR AND AL-KHIDIR, BELIEVE KIBEIDA FASTEST CHANNEL TO NIMEIRI. MOREOVER, HIS JOB DESCRIPTION INCLUDES LIAISON ROLE BETWEEN PRESIDENT AND SECURITY SERVICES WHO RESPONSIBLE MOST CONTACTS WITH ERITREANS. WHILE I DID NOT OF COURSE REFER REAL SOURCE OF OCT 3 DEADLINE DATE, I FELT IT DESIRABLE ALLUDE TO THIS POINT INDIRECTLY IN EFFORT STIMULATE FASTEST FEASIBLE ATTENTION TO OUR REQUEST BY SOMEWHAT SEDENTARY SUDANESE.
BREWER

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PAGE 01 KHARTO 02232 221147Z

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 INRE-00 NSCE-00 /026 W
071334

P R 221047Z SEP 75
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 433
INFO AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY RABAT
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
USMISSION GENEVA

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ KHARTOUM 2232

EXDIS

BEIRUT PASS USINT BAGHDAD: GENEVA FOR SAUNDERS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, SF, US
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S SEPT 16 CINCINNATI SPEECH - MIDDLE EAST

REF: STATE 222166

1. SAW FONOFF USEC MIRGHANI SEPT 20 TO OHAND HIM COPY SECRETARY'S CINCINNATI SPEECH. I STRESSED THIS WAS MAJOR ENUNCIATION FOREIGN POLICY WHICH WE HOPED WOULD BE READ IN ITS ENTIRETY. PARTICULARLY CAREFUL ATTENTION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO MIDDLE EAST PROTION. I THEN READ MIRGHANI 4TH AND 5TH PARAS OF PASSAGE CONTAINED PARA 4 REFTEL, EMPHASIZING OUR DESIRE MAINTAIN MOMENTUM.

2. MIRGHANI'S REACTION WAS PARTICULARLY POSITIVE TO SECRETARY'S REFERENCE TO SYRIA. HE SAID NIMEIRI HAD RECENTLY RECEIVED

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NUMBER OF MESSAGES FROM ARAB CHIEFS OF STATE, NOTABLY ASSAD, AND VOLUNTEERED THAT PRESIDENT HAD BEEN JUST AS FIRM IN SUPPORTING THE SINAI ACCORDS IN HIS PRIVATE RESPONSES AS HAD BEEN OFFICIAL GOS STATEMENT (KHARTOUM 2105). NIMEIRI HAD TOLD SYRIAN CHARGE THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD NOT OBJECTED TO FIRST DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENTS AND HAD ASKED RHETORICALLY WHAT WAS SO DIFFERENT ABOUT THIS SECOND ONE. I TOLD MIRGHANI THAT I WAS SURE SUDANESE POSITION ON SINAI ACCORDS HAD BEEN FAVORABLY NOTED IN WASHINGTON.

3. COMMENT: REFTEL INSTRUCTIONS WERE MOST TIMELY AS NIMEIRI RECEIVED MESSAGE FROM ASSAD ON MIDDLE EAST ON SEPT 17 AND PRESS REPORTS ASSAD'S PERSONAL ENVOY, MUTAAB SHANAN, ARRIVED LATE SEPT 20 WITH ANOTHER SPECIAL MESSAGE. CLEARLY THE MORE THAT EFFECT CAN BE GIVEN TO OUR DESIRE TO ENCOURAGE SYRIAN NEGOTIATION, THE EASIER IT WILL BE FOR SUCH SPEAR-BEARERS AS NIMEIRI TO SUSTAIN THEIR SUPPORT FOR SADAT'S STATESMANLIKE POSITION.
BREWER

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PAGE 01 KHARTO 02344 051151Z

47
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W
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O 051106Z OCT 75
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 505
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL ASMARA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY SANA IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ KHARTOUM 2344

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PINT, PFOR, ET, US
SUBJECT: KAGNEW FOUR

REF: STATE 235635

1. ITALIAN AMBASSADOR (PROTECT) REPORTS HIS GOVERNMENT HAS NOW REPEAT NOW RECEIVED INFO FROM PLF, OUTSIDE SUDAN, THAT HOSTAGES ARE WELL AND QUESTION IMPLEMENTING ANY ULTIMATUM HAS BEEN SUSPENDED. PLF SOURCE REPORTEDLY SAID IT COULD BE ARRANGED FOR ITALIANS TO VISIT HOSTAGES IF THEY WISHED TO DO SO.

2. ITALIAN AMBASSADOR BELIEVES ABOVE INFO ORIGINATED OCT 3-4 AND THAT IT COVERS ALL FOUR MEN.
BREWER

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 State Dept Review
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES HR 9/27/02
BY HR, NARA, DATE 6/16/03

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PAGE 01 KHARTO 02344 051151Z

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W
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O 051106Z OCT 75
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 505
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL ASMARA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY SANA IMMEDIATE

~~S E C R E T~~ KHARTOUM 2344

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